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Available online 27 February 2017Increasingly, connected communication technologies have resulted in people being exposed to fraudulent com-
munications by scammers and hackers attempting to gain access to computer systems for malicious purposes.
Common inﬂuence techniques, such as mimicking authority ﬁgures or instilling a sense of urgency, are used to
persuade people to respond to malevolent messages by, for example, accepting urgent updates. An ‘accept’ re-
sponse to amalevolent inﬂuencemessage can result in severe negative consequences for the user and for others,
including the organisations theywork for. This paper undertakes exploratory research to examine individual dif-
ferences in susceptibility to fraudulent computer messages when theymasquerade as interruptions during a de-
manding memory recall primary task compared to when they are presented in a post-task phase. A mixed-
methods approach was adopted to examine when and why people choose to accept or decline three types of
interrupting computer updatemessage (genuine,mimicked, and low authority) and the relative impact of such in-
terruptions on performance of a serial recall memory primary task. Results suggest that fraudulent communica-
tions aremore likely to be accepted by userswhen they interrupt a demandingmemory-based primary task, that
this relationship is impacted by the content of the fraudulent message, and that inﬂuence techniques used in
fraudulent communications can over-ride authenticity cues when individuals decide to accept an update mes-
sage. Implications for theories, such as the recently proposed Suspicion, Cognition and Automaticity Model and
the Integrated Information Processing Model of Phishing Susceptibility, are discussed.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Keywords:
Inﬂuence techniques
Malevolent interruptions
Fraudulent messages
Individual differences
Cyber-security1. Introduction
Due to the burgeoning proliferation of communicative and network-
enabled technology, the likelihood of being interrupted by a computer-
based update, advertisement or message has never been so high (e.g.,
[27,38]). We often take it for granted that such updates will occur and
their common use in software update processes means that the major-
ity of these communications are likely to be considered legitimate [4].
However, fraudulent computer-based messages continue to proliferate,
exploiting common inﬂuence techniques to increase the likelihood that
people will click on malicious links or downloads [1]. These techniques
include instilling a sense of urgency in recipients, mimicking reputable
institutions or familiar communications, and using the threat of loss in
their communications, such as account closure or system shut down
[6,36,44].
The majority of computer-based inﬂuence techniques rely on well-
documented heuristics and biases present in human decision-makingocial Sciences, University of the
ol, UK.
.
. This is an open access article under[19], such as the tendency to consider communications to be truthful
rather than deceptive [21] and tomake judgements based on emotional
responses such as fear or panic (known as the affect heuristic). However,
the extent that such forms of heuristic processing impact response be-
haviour across individuals and contexts remains uncertain. Understand-
ing the contextual and individual factors that enhance vulnerability to
fraudulent communications, including how these factors may interact,
is the primary aim of this paper and is vital if targeted mitigations,
such as training programmes, organisational procedures, and decision-
support systems, are to be developed.
In the current paper,we consider recent theories andmodels regard-
ing online trust and decision making to examine factors that impact on
response behaviour to interruptive computer updates of varying de-
grees of malevolence. This includes the recently proposed Suspicion,
Cognition and Automaticity Model relating to judgements of phishing
e-mails (SCAM; [42]), the StagedModel of Trust [34], and the Integrated
Information ProcessingModel of Phishing Susceptibility [41]. Speciﬁcal-
ly, we extend concepts within these models to judgements of computer
update messages when they occur as interruptions during a demanding
serial recall task compared to judgementsmade in a post-task question-
naire phase. By requiring participants to make judgements in twothe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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likely to be differentially invoked, the relationship between message
content, individual differences and processing strategy can be explored.
1.1. Theoretical background
Research examiningwhat makes people susceptible to malicious in-
ﬂuence in online environments has focused primarily on phishing e-
mails and e-commerce environments [36,41]. Overall, ﬁndings suggest
that people use particular informational cues, such as the message
source and inaccurate spelling or grammar to determinemessage legit-
imacy [8,17], with factors such as degree of understanding of the inter-
net contributing to individual differences in susceptibility [8,16].
Attempts to understand how fraudulent online messages affect re-
sponse behaviour have led to the development of phishing susceptibil-
ity models such as the SCAM [42], which are based on existing theories
regarding how information is processed within cognitive systems (e.g.,
Heuristic-Systematic Model, [9,39]). The SCAM suggests that heuristic
processing is a crucial factor in susceptibility to fraudulent e-mails,
with people who engage inmore ‘automatic’ forms of message process-
ing being less likely to notice errors or inconsistencies within the mes-
sage and instead responding to other aspects of message content such
as the inﬂuence techniques used [41]. These heuristic forms of process-
ing are considered to be the predominant processingmechanism, due to
the relative easewithwhich they are invoked [46].Within the SCAM, in-
dividuals are considered asmore likely to engage in suchheuristic forms
of processing if they are less suspicious of receivedmessages, potentially
due to a lack of knowledge or erroneous beliefs regarding risks of online
environments,whereas increased suspicion is reﬂected inmore system-
atic processing styles. However, the extent that such processing styles
may be differentially relied upon across individuals, contexts and mes-
sage types has yet to be systematically examined and elucidating this
is a primary aim of the current study.
The failure of decision-makers to adequately direct attentional re-
sources and elaborate sufﬁciently on inconsistencies in the message
source is addressed in the Integrated Information Processing Model of
Phishing Susceptibility [41]. This proposes that the majority of phishing
e-mails are peripherally processed, with individuals focusing on the
presence of inﬂuence cues such as urgencywithin the message content,
at the expense of authenticity information, such as sender details. Pa-
rameters of this model were investigated using a simulated phishing at-
tack on 325 university students and it was found that direction of
attention was a primary factor in responding to phishing e-mails, with
attention to the e-mail source, and spelling and grammar, suggested
to reduce susceptibility. However, attention to urgency cues increased
it due to such information monopolising available cognitive resources
[41]. Similarly, when considering the credibility of e-health websites,
Sillence et al. [34] found that individuals rely on an initial heuristic
screening of relatively superﬁcial factors, such as design appeal, when
making decisions, reﬂecting an initial trust of information. The extent
that such message factors impact response behaviour across different
individuals, and the cognitive contexts they are operating in, however,
is currently unclear.
The depth of processing that an individual engages in when faced
with a fraudulent message may be impacted by individual differences
in factors such as trust and self-control. People have been found to gen-
erally trust information in their surrounding environment unless they
have a speciﬁc reason to doubt its legitimacy [3,6]. This ‘truth bias’ is
well established in the inter-personal deception literature and has re-
cently been expanded in Truth Default Theory [21], which suggests
that for this default truth state to be temporarily abandoned, trigger
events, such as a projected motive for deception, incoherent message
content, or cues associated with dishonesty, are required. In order for
this to occur, however, individualsmustﬁrst notice these trigger events,
a process that may not necessarily occur (a) when individuals are oper-
ating under cognitive pressure, due to a reliance on heuristic processing,or (b) to an equal extent across individuals. This possibility is addressed
within the current paper.
People have been found to vary in their propensity to trust others
[22], with dispositional trust tentatively linked with the ability to accu-
rately differentiate legitimate and phishing e-mails [14]. In line with
phishing susceptibility models (e.g., [41,42]), it is possible that trust de-
creases the likelihood of identifying inconsistencies within messages
due to a failure to direct attention to authenticity information, or, be-
cause of inconsistencies attributed to other causes. For instance, when
presented with photographs of faces, older adults have been found to
be less adept at identifying cues of dishonesty; a ﬁnding that is sug-
gested to account for their increased trust and resultant susceptibility
to fraud [4]. Although such ﬁndings suggest that dispositional trust
will inﬂuence susceptibility to fraudulent computer messages, scenar-
io-speciﬁc trust related to online communication may have a greater
impact on actual susceptibility [43] and these relationships are explored
in the current study.
Resisting inﬂuence attempts is also deemed to be a difﬁcult task re-
quiring a degree of cognitive effort in regulating behaviour. As a result,
traits associated with compulsive behaviours, such as low self-control
and impulsivity, have been suggested to enhance susceptibility to inﬂu-
ence techniques, due to a lack of systematic processing of message con-
tent and a failure to consider potential consequences prior to
responding [12,40]. Understanding the impact of individual differences
in self-control, impulsivity and trust on response behaviour, and the ex-
tent that these impactsmay differ according to the cognitive context ex-
perienced, is a further aim of this paper.
Finally, it is fundamental to note that the appearance of a fraudulent
computer update is likely to interrupt individuals who are already en-
gaged in a primary task. Yet, the relative impact of being interrupted
by fraudulent messages on subsequent response behaviour has, to our
knowledge, not yet been examined. Although current research suggests
that heuristic processing increases susceptibility to such communica-
tions, the extent that these processes are invoked across individuals,
messages and contexts is less clear. Therefore, systematic investigation
of the impact of cognitive context and individual differences on re-
sponse behaviour to various fraudulent messages is required in order
to further develop current theoretical approaches. Since the majority
of fraudulent messages mimic existing organisations in order to appear
more persuasive [5,36], the current study focuses on exploring the po-
tential interaction between both cognitive context (i.e., the likely infor-
mation processing strategy invoked) and individual differences, and so-
called ‘authority’ inﬂuence techniques, namely whether the absence of
authority information is more likely to trigger suspicion in users than
the presence of errors within such information.
2. The current study
In the current study, we undertake exploratory research that aims to
extend previous theory by examining the relationship between individ-
ual differences, cognitive context, andmessage factors to further under-
stand response behaviour to fraudulent computer updates. Speciﬁcally,
we utilise a task interruption approach that is known to be cognitively
demanding (e.g., [28]), whereby participants complete a serial recall
workingmemory task and are interrupted during this task by computer
updates of varying degrees of authenticity purporting to require critical
action. Serial recall tasks typically involve trying to remember a se-
quence of items, usually six to nine numbers, letters, or both and place
a high demand on verbal phonological working memory (see [2]). Dur-
ing the task, participants must respond to occasional interruptions by
computer update messages that contain either (a) genuine authority
cues (i.e., designed to appear to be from a genuine authority source
and do not contain any errors or inconsistencies), (b)mimicked author-
ity cues (i.e., mimic an authority source but contain errors) or (c) no au-
thority information (i.e., no details regarding the message source). In
addition to response behaviour, this design also provides a unique
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different fraudulent message cues, thus aiding understanding of the
cognitive mechanisms involved. Following the serial recall phase, par-
ticipants respond to the same messages in a questionnaire phase,
whereby there are no additional cognitive demands and therefore par-
ticipants will likely have more cognitive resource available to process
information. This design allowed us to directly examine the relative im-
pact of authority information on the response behaviour of individuals
when they are operating in an environment that induces cognitive pres-
sure, and therefore aremore likely to use heuristic processing strategies,
compared to when no additional cognitive demands are placed on
them.
2.1. Hypotheses
According to previous theoretical work regarding susceptibility to
deceptive messages [41,42], the presence of urgency and loss inﬂuence
techniqueswithin computer updatemessages, combinedwith the pres-
sure of returning to, and continuing with, a demanding primary task,
should result in recipients responding tomessages without considering
the possibility that they are fraudulent. Instead, they should be more
likely to engage in simple heuristic processing that defaults to a trusting
stance [21,42] and thus will likely fail to notice differences in authentic-
ity cues. When individuals havemore time to process messages and are
under less cognitive pressure, however, potential inconsistencies may
be more likely to be noticed, leading to illegitimate messages being de-
clined. However, if the presence of authority information is still capable
of overriding the presence of errors, then fraudulent messages that
mimic ‘authority sources’ should still be more difﬁcult to identify than
those that donot contain any authority information, even under optimal
processing conditions. Finally, we know from previous literature that
differences in time spent dealing with an interrupting task impacts on
the degree of disruption shown when individuals resume the primary
task [13,26]. Since fraudulent messages contain cues that may lead re-
cipients to question the message legitimacy [8,17,41], if these cues are
noticed then the time required to respond to these messages may differ
from genuinemessages. This could either be reﬂected in longer process-
ing times of fraudulent messages to consider potential authenticity
cues, or alternatively faster processing times due to such messages
being disregarded. These response time differences should also be
reﬂected in a corresponding impact on subsequent primary task
performance.
H1. If increased cognitive complexity makes recipients more suscepti-
ble to fraudulent messages due to the use of heuristic processing strat-
egies, it is predicted that:
a) There will be no difference in response choice between genuine and
mimicked or low authority messages during the serial recall task,
due to increased cognitive pressure leading to a failure to identify in-
consistencies in message content.
b) There will be no difference in performance on the serial recall task
between genuine andmimicked or low authority message interrup-
tions, due to all messages being processed to an equal extent (i.e.,
heuristically) and therefore having an equal impact on the resump-
tion of the primary task.
c) When participants have unlimited time to inspect the content of
messages, mimicked and low authority messages will be declined
signiﬁcantly more than genuine messages, due to a higher degree
of systematic processing aiding the identiﬁcation of inconsistencies.
The extent that participants are susceptible to responding to fraudu-
lent messages heuristically may also be impacted by individual differ-
ences in dispositional trust and self-control [12,23,24,32]. People who
show a high propensity to trust may consider messages as more likelyto be genuine [14] and therefore will be less likely to actively search
for, or evaluate, inconsistencies that suggest a message is illegitimate.
Previous literature in relation to inﬂuence also suggests that partici-
pants with lower levels of self-control, and higher levels of impulsivity
and sensation-seeking, will be more susceptible to negative urgency-
based inﬂuence techniques, due to an increased likelihood of
responding before potential inconsistencies have been identiﬁed [12,
40]. However, whether such differences will have an additional effect
in scenarios where participants are already likely to be using heuristic
processing styles (i.e., when under a high degree of cognitive pressure),
is currently unknown.
H2. If individual differences in dispositional trust and self-control inﬂu-
ence the extent that messages are processed using heuristic processing
strategies, it is predicted that:
a) Dispositional trust will be positively related to accept behaviour for
mimicked and low authority messages due to a lower likelihood of
identifying inconsistencies.
b) Self-control will be negatively related to accept behaviour for mim-
icked and low authority messages, such that those low in self-con-
trol will be less able to inhibit a potential accept response when
faced with persuasive messages compared to those higher in self-
control.
Finally, the current paper also explores participants' self-reported
reasons for choosing to accept or decline update messages using a
post-task questionnaire. Thiswill allow the role of inﬂuence techniques,
authenticity cues, and factors such as routine behaviour and knowledge,
to be explored using a qualitative methodology. Factors included in the
SCAM [42] suggest that the presence of inﬂuence techniques may over-
ride authenticity cues in participant decisionmaking and this may com-
binewith themes related to participant knowledge, perception of threat
(both in relation to accepting and declining updates), and their usual
norms of behaviour, to impact on decision making. We anticipate that
themes identiﬁed in qualitative analysis of participant reasons for
their chosen response will highlight these factors as being a potential
mechanism for both accepting and declining updates.
3. Method
3.1. Participants
87 participants were recruited to participate in an experiment
concerning decision making during complex tasks via the Undergradu-
ate Psychology Participant Pool operated by the University Psychology
Group. For measures of the disruption caused by interruptions, this
number was adequate to detect a small to medium effect size (Cohen's
f= 0.1–0.25) with power of 0.8 (determined using G*Power 3.1.7 soft-
ware; [10]). Seventy participantswerewomen and 17men. Participants
had amean age of 18.56 (SD=1.82) andwere tested in a computer lab-
oratory and providedwith both written and oral instructions presented
by the experimenter.
3.2. Design
A repeated-measures design involved all participants completing
the same computer-based task and post-task questionnaires. Within
the main experiment, there were 36 serial recall trials, and nine of
thesewere interrupted bymessages that required a response (either ac-
cept or decline). Each of these interrupting messages was one of three
types: genuine authority, mimicked authority, and low authority, and
each participant had three instances of each message type. Further de-
tails regarding message type are provided in the Materials and
Procedure Section. Dependent variables included the number of to-be-
Fig. 1. Example genuine authority update.
Fig. 2. Example mimicked authority update.
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of 9 items per trial/condition) and the proportion of genuine, mimicked
and low authority interrupting messages that were accepted (maxi-
mum of 3 per condition).
3.3. Materials and procedure
There were two experiment phases. The ﬁrst involved participants
completing the serial recall task whilst being exposed to computer up-
date interruptions. The second involved completing a computer-based
questionnaire that included re-evaluation of update messages as well
as self-report measures of self-control, trust, impulsivity, and sensation
seeking. These phases and speciﬁc materials are described below.
3.3.1. Phase 1 tasks
The primary serial recall and secondary interrupting message tasks
were programmed using PsychoPy (http://www.psychopy.org: [32]),
an open-source experiment generation software package. The serial re-
call task involved the presentation of a string of nine letters and num-
bers in the center of the screen simultaneously for 9-s in an Arial size
24 font presented in white on a dark grey background. Each number
and letter string was designed to mimic a mock National Insurance
(NI) number (equivalent to a US Social Security Number). After 9-s
the letter/number string disappeared and following a 2-second reten-
tion interval a message reading ‘enter code’ appeared on the screen
and remained there for 10-s. During this 10-second period, participants
needed to write in an answer booklet as many numbers and letters that
they could recall in the order in which the information was originally
presented. For any numbers or letters that they could not remember,
they could leave a blank space or make a guess. After the 10-second re-
call period, participants had to ‘press spacebar to start next trial.’ Once
the spacebar was pressed, there was a 500-msec interval before the
next trial started. A total of 36 trialswere used, eachusing a different let-
ter and number string. Number and letter stringswere randomly gener-
ated prior to the experiment, and the same number and letter strings
were used for each participant. The same format was used for all num-
ber and letter strings across all serial recall trials.
Of the 36 trials, nine contained an interruptionmessage, representing
25% of all trials in order to reduce the frequency and predictability of in-
terruptions for participants [29]. Interrupting messages consisted of sys-
tem security-related update messages appearing in the center of the
screen measuring approximately 150 mm × 60 mm. These occurred fol-
lowing the 2-second retention-interval (after the letter/number string
had disappeared) but before participants were able to start recalling the
string (i.e., before the ‘enter code’ instruction). Participants were
instructednever to startwriting responses until the enter code instruction
appeared andwere to stopwriting when it disappeared. The interrupting
message remained on the screen until the participant chose to either de-
cline it by pressing ‘c’ on the keyboard or accept it by pressing ‘a’ on the
keyboard. Following an ‘a’ or ‘c’ response, the update disappeared and
was replaced by the enter code instruction. As on non-interruption trials,
participants were then required to write the letter/number string within
the answer booklet. The order of trials was initially randomised and this
same order was then used for all participants.
Of the nine interruption trials, three updatemessageswere designed
as genuine authority update messages (Fig. 1), three as mimicked au-
thority updatemessages (Fig. 2) and three as low authority updatemes-
sages (Fig. 3). Genuine authority messages were designed to contain
speciﬁc details linked to recognised expertise, organisations and soft-
ware manufacturers (e.g., accurate programme reference, presence of
a copyright symbol and genuine website link). Mimicked authority
messageswere designed to contain the same level of detail but provided
an inaccurate reference (spelling error), an inaccurate website link and
lacked a copyright symbol. These messages were designed tomimic the
communications of legitimate software or organisations, as commonly
found in the techniques of scams that mimic trusted institutions orentities. Low authority messages were designed to contain no speciﬁc
details relating to the sender of the communication (e.g., programmes
or applications) and no website link. Therefore, the message contained
no references to potential authority sources.
Updates were matched as best as possible to ensure that they were
of a similar lengthwhilst retaining a sense of realism in different scenar-
io content across each message. The mean word length within updates
was 50.1 words (excluding website links), with the minimum number
of words = 34 and the maximum = 71 (Genuine Authority M =
54.7; Low AuthorityM= 53.7; Mimicked AuthorityM= 44.3). All up-
dates included the same inﬂuence techniques (urgency and impact), re-
quiring an urgent response to counter a purported threat, and focused
on anti-virus, spyware, programme critical ﬁxes, and expiry of licenses.
Comprehensive written instructions were provided prior to the task
and were read aloud by the experimenter. As well as instructing partici-
pants on how the tasks would function and what they needed to do to
make responses and when (i.e., only following the enter code instruc-
tion), the experimenter also emphasised that the letter/number and the
security update tasks were of equal importance. Participants completed
two practice trials, one containing a genuine themed interrupting update
message and one without an interruption. Prior to the start of the com-
puter task, participants were also presented with a brief message
displaying a generic system security message for a 15-second period.
This was based on system security log-on messages that are often used
by organisations to ensure that employees are aware of cyber-security
policy when logging on to internal systems and networks. The message
in the current experiment contained the following information:
‘This system is protected by virus protection software and updates are
installed on a regular basis. However, please be vigilant about the security
of this system by ensuring that any attempts by applications to access sys-
tem information or data are legitimate. Some applications may attempt to
access system information and personal or organisational data on this de-
vice with or without authorisation. The virus protection software installed
on this system will make every attempt to destroy any such threats’.
This message was presented to make participants aware that al-
though their computer system was protected it was still vulnerable to
attack via fraudulent communications or malware attempting to inﬁl-
trate the system. It was expected that whilst participants would read
this message, they would likely differ in the extent that the information
was processed. Following the computer task participants were tested
Fig. 3. Example low authority update.
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content; and (3) whether they felt that they took themessage seriously.
Following this, they were also asked to judge the degree to which they
abided by the message content, i.e., 0% of the time to 100% of the time.
In total, Phase 1 took approximately 15–20 min to complete.
3.3.2. Phase 2 tasks
Following Phase 1, participants were again presented with each of
the 9 updates/interruptions via the Qualtrics online survey platform
(www.qualtrics.com). Participants could spend as long as they wished
reading the update before answering the following questions: Would
you ordinarily accept or decline this message? (Accept or Decline);
Why? (open-ended response). This unlimited response time, combined
with providing reasons for their decision, would likely maximise the
likelihood that systematic processing strategies are used,making partic-
ipants more aware that some of the messages may not be trustworthy
and thus impacting their likely information search strategies. They
were then asked a series of questions related to cyber security aware-
ness, which included: ‘To what extent do you trust communications
from your computer system, such as security updates, in general?’;
‘How conﬁdent are you in your ability to differentiate genuine commu-
nications from scam communications in daily life?’; ‘How would you
rate your awareness of the common techniques used in scams?’ and
‘To what degree did you trust the system to deal with malicious at-
tacks?’ These four questions had Likert response scales ranging from 1
to 7. Participants were also asked ‘Have you previously been the victim
of a computer-based/online scam?’ with a ‘yes’/’no’ response.
Next, participants completed a series of self-report questionnaire
measures to examine individual differences in factors that might have
contributed to how they chose to handle interrupting update messages.
The Brief Self-Control Scale is a 13-item self-reportmeasure designed to
measure trait self-control and the Cronbach's alpha for this question-
naire has been reported as 0.89 (BSCS; [37]). Participants respond on a
5-point Likert Scale to questions such as ‘I am good at resisting tempta-
tion’. The NEO Trust facet is a 10-item self-report measure designed to
measure generic propensity to trust and the Cronbach's alpha for this
questionnaire has been reported as between 0.82 and 0.88 on internet
and ﬁeld samples [18]. Participants respond on a 5-point Likert ScaleFig. 4. Effect of interrupt message type on serial recall memory. Note. Error bars
represent ± standard error.to questions such as ‘I believe that others have good intentions’ (NEO-
T; www.ipip.org). The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale is a 30-item self-re-
port measure divided into 3 sub-scales: attentional impulsivity, non-
planning impulsivity and motor impulsivity. It is designed to measure
trait impulsivity and the Cronbach's alpha for this questionnaire has
been reported as 0.82 in testing with undergraduate students (BIS;
[30]). Participants respond on a 4-point Likert Scale to questions such
as ‘I concentrate easily’. Finally, the Brief Sensation-Seeking Scale is an
8-item self-reportmeasure designed tomeasure trait sensation-seeking
and the Cronbach's alpha for this questionnaire has been reported as
0.74 (BSSS; [15]). Participants respond on a 4-point Likert Scale to ques-
tions such as ‘I get restless when I spend too much time at home’. In
total, Phase 2 of the experiment took approximately 20 min to com-
plete. Following this, participants were fully debriefed.
4. Results and discussion
All tests are two-tailedwith alpha levels of 0.05. Effect sizeswere de-
termined using Cohen's d for t-tests (with 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8 indicating
small, medium and large effect sizes respectively) and Cohen's f for F
tests (with 0.1, 0.25 and 0.4 indicating small, medium and large effect
sizes) [45].
4.1. H1: the impact of message authority and cognitive complexity on
judgements
Table 1 illustrates the number of messages that were acceptedwhen
presented during the serial recall memory trials (Max 3 per condition)
and during the questionnaire phase of the study (Max 3 per condition).
A 2 (serial recall phase, questionnaire phase) × 3 (high authority, mim-
icked authority, low authority) factorial repeated measures ANOVA re-
vealed signiﬁcant main effects of phase, F(1, 86) = 5.11, MSE = 2.46,
p=0.026, f=0.24, with messages more likely to be accepted in the se-
rial recall phase than the questionnaire phase, indicative of a truth bias
under heuristic processing conditions, and message authority, F(2,
172)= 61.03,MSE=0.49, p b 0.001, f=0.84, and a signiﬁcant interac-
tion, F(2, 172)=25.12,MSE=0.47, p b 0.001, f=0.54. During the serial
recall phase, whilst accepts for genuine and mimicked authority mes-
sages did not differ, low authoritymessages were accepted signiﬁcantly
less than both genuine and mimicked authority messages (ps= 0.007
and 0.038 respectively). Thus, Hypothesis 1a was only supported for
mimicked authority messages. During the questionnaire phase, accepts
signiﬁcantly differed between all message types, with more genuine
than low authority messages accepted and more genuine authority
than mimicked authority messages accepted (ps b 0.001), supporting
Hypothesis 1c. However, the difference in message accepts between
the serial recall phase and questionnaire phase was only signiﬁcant for
low authority messages (p b 0.001), with fewer low authority messages
accepted in the questionnaire phase (approximately 27% of messages
accepted) compared to the serial recall phase (approximately 56%).
The lack of a signiﬁcant difference for mimicked authority messages is
particularly striking given the greater likelihood of increased suspicion
in the questionnaire phase due to the requirement to describe the deci-
sion process. This suggests that the lack of authority cues present in low
authority messages are more likely to be noticed than errors in mim-
icked authority messages in both high and low cognitive pressureTable 1
Number of authority messages accepted when presented during serial recall phase and
questionnaire phase.
Message authority Serial recall phase Questionnaire phase
M SD M SD
Low 1.68 1.25 0.82 0.95
Mimicked 1.89 1.23 1.65 1.04
Genuine 1.98 1.25 2.15 0.92
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for questionnaire measures.
Trust Sensation seeking Self-control Impulsivity
Min 21 12 16 21
Max 43 38 58 103
M 34.15 25.74 39.59 64.16
SD 5.02 5.35 8.22 11.14
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decline low authority updates during the questionnaire phase of the
study, suggesting that greater systematic processing aids in the identiﬁ-
cation of these particular cues [41,42].
Serial recall memory performance was also considered for each of
the four conditions (no interruption, low authority updates, mimicked
authority updates, and genuine authority updates). A clear trend was
found such that as the authority of interrupt messages reduced (from
genuine to low), so did task performance. A repeated measures
ANOVA, with a Huynh-Feldt correction applied due to a violation of
sphericity, revealed a signiﬁcantmain effect of interruptingmessage au-
thority, F(2.77, 237.93) = 18.96, MSE = 1.20, p b 0.001, f = 0.47. As
would be expected, Bonferroni pairwise comparisons revealed that seri-
al recall was higher in the no interruption condition than in the low au-
thority, mimicked authority and genuine authority message conditions
(p's b 0.001). However, serial recall memory was also higher in the gen-
uine authority condition than the low authority condition, although this
differencewasmarginally signiﬁcant (p=0.05). The low andmimicked
authority conditions and the genuine and mimicked authority condi-
tions did not differ signiﬁcantly. Thus Hypothesis 1b was supported
for mimicked authority messages only. However, this reﬂects the ﬁnd-
ing of lower message accepts for low authority messages during the se-
rial recall phase. This suggests that low authority messages disrupt
performance to a greater degree than messages that appear genuine
due to the triggering of suspicion and the resultant requirement to in-
voke more systematic processing of message content, enabling further
consideration of the lack of authority cues and hence whether the mes-
sage should be declined due to potential illegitimacy [21,42] (Fig. 4).
The ﬁnding that low authority messages disrupt processing to a
greater degree is also reﬂected in differences in message processing
time.Whilst a similar amount of timewas spent viewing interruptmes-
sages in the genuine (M 5.47s) and mimicked authority conditions (M
5.37s), participants spent approximately half a second longer viewing
low authority messages (M 6.00s) before responding in the serial recall
phase. A repeated measures ANOVA, with a Huynh-Feldt correction ap-
plied due to a violation of sphericity, revealed that this time difference
was signiﬁcant, F(1.77, 152.10) = 4.19, MSE = 2.71, p = 0.021, f =
0.22, with Bonferroni pairwise comparisons revealing that signiﬁcantly
more time was spent viewing low authoritymessages than genuine au-
thoritymessages (p=0.027).Whilst more timewas spent viewing low
thanmimicked authoritymessages, this difference wasmarginally non-
signiﬁcant (p= 0.07).
Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that heuristic processing
strategies were utilised during the serial recall phase of the experiment,
resulting in errors contained within mimicked authority messages not
being identiﬁed, and such messages being processed and accepted to
the same degree as genuine authority messages [41]. Interestingly, the
lack of authority information contained within low authority messages
seemed to invoke deeper processing strategies that were both more
time-consuming and had a greater impact on resultant task perfor-
mance, likely due to the triggering of suspicion [21]. This suspicion,
and the resultant processing differences, was reﬂected in more low au-
thority messages being declined. Since authority cues have been
highlighted as a key factor in determining online credibility [11], the
lack of sender details in low authoritymessages likely resulted in partic-
ipants taking longer to consider the possibility that these updates may
not be genuine. This may lead to a greater degree of suspicion being in-
voked, reducing the degree of initial trust otherwise experienced in on-
line communications [34].
4.2. H2: the relationship between individual differences and response
behaviour
To examine whether individual differences related to trust and self-
control increased the likelihood of acceptingmimicked and low author-
ity message updates across the two phases, Pearson bivariatecorrelations were conducted. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for
the questionnairemeasures and Table 3 presents r values for all correla-
tions. In contrast to Hypothesis 2a, a trend towards a negative relation-
ship was found between trust and message accepts for mimicked
authority messages within the serial recall phase (r = −0.195, p =
0.07), such that higher propensity to trust scores were related to a
lower likelihood of accepting messages. Although the relationship was
not signiﬁcant for low authority messages (r = −0.141, p = 0.19),
this result was also in a negative direction, and a signiﬁcant negative re-
lationship was also shown with genuine authority messages
(r=−0.141, p=0.017). This suggests that the presence of authenticity
cues did not alter this relationship. Although this contrastswith the pro-
posed relationship in Hypothesis 2a, it may be that higher propensity to
trust leads to a reduction in accept behaviour due to themaintenance of
system security via updates not being considered a priority. Thismay be
due to a failure to consider themalevolent intentions of otherswhomay
attempt to inﬁltrate the system, reducing the perceived importance of
maintaining up-to-date software. For instance, individuals high in dis-
positional trust may not consider the potential threat of operating on-
line (i.e., they believe the intentions of other online actors are
genuine). As a result, they are less likely to consider computer security
to be a priority and therefore are also less likely to accept computer up-
dates that maintain security, regardless of their apparent authenticity.
Conversely, individuals who are more suspicious may prioritise
accepting such updates in order to counter any potential threats that
they perceive [22].
No signiﬁcant relationshipswere found between any of the other in-
dividual difference measures and message accepts during either the se-
rial recall phase or the questionnaire phase, so Hypothesis 2b was also
not supported. It is possible that negative urgency inﬂuence techniques
are able to impact on response behaviour regardless of the degree of
trait self-control that a recipient has, such that individual differences
are effectively overridden by such message factors. Future work should
focus on clarifying this potential relationship between individual differ-
ences, such as self-control, and the presence of various inﬂuence
techniques.
To examine whether a more context-speciﬁc conceptualisation of
trust had a greater impact on accept behaviour for fraudulentmessages,
the relationship between participant responses on scenario-speciﬁc
questions (e.g., trust in computer communications and trust in the sys-
tem to deal with malicious attacks) and message accepts for mimicked
and low authority messages was examined using Pearson bivariate cor-
relations. Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for the scenario speciﬁc
questions and Table 5 shows r values for all correlations. Signiﬁcant pos-
itive relationships were found between trust in computer communica-
tions and message accepts in the questionnaire phase for both
mimicked and low authority messages (mimicked: r = 0.44,
p b 0.001; low: r=0.41, p b 0.001), such that increased trust in comput-
er communications was related to an increased likelihood of accepting
bothmimicked and lowauthoritymessages undermore systematic pro-
cessing conditions. This suggests that Hypothesis 2a is supported when
context-speciﬁc conceptualisations of trust are invoked [43].When par-
ticipants were under more cognitive pressure in the serial recall phase,
however, and therefore more likely to respond heuristically, this effect
was only found for low authority messages. This differential relation-
shipwith low andmimicked authoritymessageswas also demonstrated
in the positive relationship between trust in the system and accepts for
Table 3
Pearson bivariate correlations (r values) between questionnaire measures and response
choice according to message type.
Trust
Sensation
seeking Self-control Impulsivity
Accepts SR
phase
Genuine −0.256⁎ −0.010 0.085 0.053
Mimicked −0.195 0.084 0.014 0.083
Low −0.141 0.021 −0.062 0.067
Accepts Q
phase
Genuine −0.110 −0.019 −0.032 −0.125
Mimicked −0.174 0.059 −0.092 −0.032
Low 0.023 0.019 −0.172 −0.006
⁎ Correlation is signiﬁcant at b0.05 level (two-tailed).
Table 5
Pearson bivariate correlations (r values) between scenario speciﬁc questions and response
choice according to message type.
Trust in
computer
messages
Conﬁdence
in detecting
Awareness of
scam
techniques
Trust in
system
Accepts
SR
phase
Genuine 0.121 0.137 −0.118 0.020
Mimicked 0.168 0.106 −0.151 0.106
Low 0.215⁎ 0.107 −0.075 0.276⁎
Accepts
Q
phase
Genuine 0.282⁎ 0.066 −0.227⁎ 0.122
Mimicked 0.439⁎⁎ −0.059 −0.356⁎⁎ 0.037
Low 0.414⁎⁎ −0.083 −0.182 0.315⁎⁎
⁎ Correlation is signiﬁcant at b0.05 level (two-tailed).
⁎⁎ Correlation is signiﬁcant at b0.01 level (two-tailed).
Table 6
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r= 0.28, p= 0.01; questionnaire phase: r= 0.41, p b 0.005). This sug-
gests that increased trust may increase susceptibility to fraudulent cues
that others identify more easily (i.e., a lack of authority cues), even in
contextswhere systematic processing ismore likely [4]. A lack of sender
information could, therefore, either (a) be less likely to be noticed by
more trusting individuals due to differences in attention direction pro-
cesses, in line with heuristic defaults, or (b) not be considered a threat
even if it is noticed, with differential threat perceptions resulting in a
failure of identiﬁed information to ‘trigger’ suspicion in line with the
mechanisms of Truth Default Theory [21]. Future work should focus
on disentangling these possibilities.
In contrast to individual differences that may increase susceptibility,
a signiﬁcant negative correlation was found between self-reported
awareness of scam techniques and message accepts for mimicked au-
thority messages in the questionnaire phase (r = −0.36, p b 0.001),
and a negative trend for low authority messages (r = −0.18, p =
0.09), such that greater awareness of scam techniques was related to a
decreased likelihood of accepting fraudulentmessages. This stronger re-
lationship with mimicked authority messages suggests that awareness
aids in the identiﬁcation ofmore fraudulentmessages that aremore dif-
ﬁcult to identify. However, this only occurs when the opportunity is
provided to engage in more systematic processing strategies, with
awareness having no impact on the likelihood of accepting fraudulent
updates during the serial recall task. This suggests that any protective
impact is overridden when participants are operating under a higher
degree of cognitive pressure and therefore are more likely to rely on
heuristic processing strategies.
4.3. Why do people accept or decline?
Open-ended responses in relation to why participants chose to ac-
cept or decline a particular update were included as the data set for
qualitative analysis. Thematic analysis was used to identify the presence
of themes that participants reported as inﬂuencing them to accept a
message or to decline it during thequestionnaire phase. A primarily the-
oretical approach was used when analysing the data, such that general
themes of interest were identiﬁed prior to data analysis based on theo-
retical ideas [5,36,41,42]. These included:
(a) Use of Inﬂuence Techniques - reference to the inﬂuence techniques
that were present inmessages, namely, known and trusted orga-
nisations or programmes (authority), the requirement toTable 4
Descriptive statistics of scenario speciﬁc measures.
Trust in computer
messages
Conﬁdence in
detecting
Awareness of scam
techniques
Trust in
system
Min 1 1 1 1
Max 7 6 7 7
M 3.91 4.23 4.24 4.59
SD 1.53 1.53 1.62 1.47undertake the action immediately (urgency) or loss of some
form of functionality (loss).
(b) Use of Authenticity Cues - reference to authenticity cues, such as
spelling errors, grammatical errors, poor design or layout, mes-
sage inaccuracies or inconsistencies.
(c) Routine - reference to behavioural habits, such as always
accepting or declining certain types of update.
(d) Degree of Knowledge - reference to a lack of knowledge, such as
not understanding computer systems sufﬁciently to do anything
other than their chosen action.
Additional themes or sub-themes were also identiﬁed during the
analysis process and these primarily related to:
• Context-speciﬁc reasons, whereby elements of thewider context inﬂu-
ence response choice. For example, the computer not appearing to be
running slowly or having any issues that would mean the update is
considered necessary at that point in time.
• ‘Whynot?’ as amotivator for response choice. For example, individuals
considering that the update would have no negative impact on their
current operations, and so not identifying a reason to decline it.
Since we were interested in understanding the speciﬁc aspects of
each message that may have inﬂuenced participant decision making,
the qualitative data set was divided into responses relating to accepting
a message and those related to declining a message for each of the nine
interrupting messages. Following familiarisation with the data, initial
codes were produced and considered in relation to each data item.
Coded data extracts were then considered in relation to the a priori
themes described above and the formation of potential sub-themes.
Themes and sub-themes were then reviewed and reﬁned and the
dataset revisited in relation to these. Counts of themes according to re-
sponse choice (accept vs. decline) are shown in Table 6 and according to
message type in Table 7 and themost common themes are discussed in
more detail below.
4.3.1. The use of inﬂuence techniques
The ability of urgency cues to attract and monopolise attentional re-
sources has been discussed in previous theoretical models ofProportion of themeswhen respondents accept amessage compared towhen they decline
a message.
Accept Decline
Authenticity cues 28.2% 34.6%
Inﬂuence cues 60.5% –
Failed inﬂuence cues – 41.4%
Context cues 0.9% 7.9%
Routine cues 4.6% 6.7%
Knowledge cues 0.6% 9.3%
Why not? 5.2% –
Total 100% 100%
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crease the likelihood that greater emphasis will be placed on inﬂuence-
related message content at the expense of authenticity information.
Linking communications with authority ﬁgures is an established inﬂu-
ence technique that exploits the tendency for individuals to comply
with authority requests and its use has been found to impact on the rel-
ative effectiveness of genuinemalwarewarnings [25]. In linewith this, a
number of responses related to messages being from recognisable and
known software providers or organisations, which were considered to
signify a message as likely to be both legitimate and important. For ex-
ample, ‘I would trust that the update needs to be done, as it is from [ ] which
I recognise and trust’.
Similar to exploiting authority references, placing individuals under
a time pressure and instilling a sense of urgency when making a deci-
sion is a technique that can be found in a number of scam communica-
tions [36]. In line with this, the presence of cues related to the time-
critical nature of the request, suggesting that themessage should be ac-
cepted in order to address an urgent issue, was also mentioned by a
number of respondents. For instance, it ‘indicates something urgent’
and ‘because when I hear threats I instantly think that I need to ﬁx it’.
The concept of loss aversion is alsowell documentedwithin the psy-
chology literature [20], with individuals motivated to avoid potential
losses in the future. In line with this, accepting a message in order to
avoid a potential negative impact was often highlighted, particularly
in relation to avoiding a loss of functionality or security. For example,
the ‘risk to computer if you don't’ or ‘[if I don't] computer could crash mid
way through something’.
However, although inﬂuence techniques may be effective in moti-
vating an individual to respond to a message, they can also fail to have
the desired impact on the recipient, and these ‘failed inﬂuence’ attempts
were present in a number of the reasons that participants gave for de-
clining a message. In particular, this related to the message failing to
persuade the recipient that the update was necessary or important,
e.g., ‘because it does not seem urgent’, lacking in sufﬁcient detail or the re-
cipient not understanding themessage sufﬁciently to act upon it, for ex-
ample ‘vague message, doesn't tell me what it's doing’.
4.3.2. The use of authenticity cues
When participants considered their response decisions, this was
based on the questionnaire phase wherebymore systematic processing
strategies were likely to be used. As such, increased suspicionmay have
increased the likelihood of considering authenticity cues when making
decisions. In accordancewith this, reasons regarding response decisions
often related towhether amessagewas likely to be genuine and the dif-
ferent factors that were used to judge legitimacy. Some of these authen-
ticity cues related to tangible features within the message, such as the
presence of a website link or a trademark symbol (or lack thereof), for
example ‘it supplies a link below so it seems more trustworthy’ and ‘the [
] has a little circle which means it is probably safe?’,whereas others relat-
ed tomore intuitive and subjective feelings of legitimacy, such as ‘I don't
trust it’.Table 7
Proportion of themeswhen respondents accept amessage compared towhen they decline
a message according to message authority.
Genuine
authority
Mimicked
authority
Low authority
Accept Decline Accept Decline Accept Decline
Authenticity cues 36.5% 32.3% 23.8% 36.8% 12.7% 34.4%
Inﬂuence cues 57.1% – 60.7% – 70.4% –
Failed inﬂuence cues – 38.7% – 42.4% – 42%
Context cues 0.5% 11.8% 1.1% 4% 1.4% 8.5%
Routine cues 2.3% 12.9% 5.9% 8.8% 8.4% 8%
Knowledge cues 0.9% 4.3% 0.6% 8% – 7%
Why not? 2.7% – 7.7% – 7% –
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%4.3.3. Routine
A small number of respondents also referenced their usual behav-
iour when responding to similar messages in the past, supporting ele-
ments of the SCAM [42] related to the role of habitual and routine
behaviour on judgements. For instance, defaulting to accepting a mes-
sage even if unsure about its meaning because that is how such mes-
sages are usually handled. Often such behaviour was linked to a lack
of technical knowledge, highlighting the role of knowledge in perceived
ability to cope with situations that may arise, with some habitual re-
sponse behaviours appearing to emerge in response to a lack of techni-
cal understanding. For example, ‘I don't know anything about computers
so I just trust the little box’ and ‘Know the phrase run-time error but wasn't
sure what its asking for. So I do an ‘old-man’ move and accept it anyway’.
Familiarity with the message content was also raised as a reason for
accepting a message, with having seen a message before resulting in it
being considered “normal” and therefore less likely to be fraudulent.
For example, ‘I see this all the time’ or ‘It seemsmore usual and I've encoun-
tered similar messages before’.
Alternatively, habitual behaviours (e.g., ‘I don't accept pop-ups’) and
lack of familiarity (‘Not familiar with the message’) were also cited as a
reason to decline updates, such as defaulting to declining any update
or considering an unusual message as more likely to be suspicious. To
our knowledge, the role of familiarity with message content on re-
sponse behaviour is not addressed in currentmodels and thereforewar-
rants further examination in the future.
4.4. Comparing accept and decline decision themes
Table 6 shows the relative proportion of themes when respondents
chose to accept the message and when they chose to decline it. When
participants chose to accept a message, reasons referring to the inﬂu-
ence techniques used were the most highly cited (60.5%), with authen-
ticity cues the second most common (28.2%), suggesting that message
factors related to authority, urgency and potential loss inﬂuence self-re-
ported decision making to a greater degree than authenticity cues.
When participants declined the message, primary reasons related to
not considering the update as important or necessary, whichwe consid-
er to be a failure of the inﬂuence technique to effectively persuade indi-
viduals to respond, potentially due to these participants having greater
resistance to such techniques (41.4%). Declining a message was also
often linked to a lack of authenticity cues (34.6%).
Reasons not solely related to the message itself accounted for a
higher proportion of responses when declining messages than when
accepting them, suggesting that factors such as routine behaviour, the
particular context and level of knowledge (whether technical or risk-re-
lated) have a greater impact on behaviour when choosing to decline a
message. This could be considered in relation to a general tendency to
accept requests unless there is a reason not to, such as doubts regarding
message authenticity, wider impacts on behaviour, or established habits
and norms.
In order to examine the potential impact of message type on deci-
sion-making, the presence of themes was further broken down accord-
ing tomessage type (i.e., genuine, mimicked or low authoritymessage).
This showed that the inﬂuence techniques used within messages con-
tributed to a substantial proportion of reasons providedwhen accepting
messages across allmessage types. This proportionwas also found to in-
crease as the authenticity cues present within the message diminished
(Genuine Authority: 57.1% inﬂuence cue; Mimicked Authority: 60.7%
inﬂuence cue; Low Authority: 70.4% inﬂuence cue). This suggests that
the presence of inﬂuence techniques such as threat of loss and urgency
can still provide a valid reason to respond to fraudulent messages,
supporting the ﬁndings of work by Vishwanath et al. [41] that inﬂuence
cues may be processed to the detriment of authenticity cues.
Overall, reference to authenticity cueswhen accepting amessage re-
ducedwithmimicked (23.8%) compared to genuine authoritymessages
(36.5%), suggesting that the relative differences in authenticity cues
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despite a reduction in references to authenticity cues in thesemessages,
they are still highlighted in a substantial proportion of reasons for
accepting. Therefore, although a proportion of responders notice the in-
consistencies and errors within these messages, these cues are not no-
ticed by all. This may be accounted for by individual differences in
trust and awareness (as shown in Section 4.2), as well as varying de-
grees of risk awareness and technical knowledge in relation to comput-
er updates, whereby a higher weighting is given to inﬂuence cues such
as professed authority than to potential authenticity cues whenmaking
decisions. The relative increase in the proportion of knowledge-related
factorswhen decliningmimicked and low authoritymessages (Genuine
Authority: 4.3%; Mimicked Authority: 8%; Low Authority: 7%) also sup-
ports the role of cyber risk and technical awareness in identifying and
avoiding suspicious messages, with such knowledge potentially
impacting the identiﬁcation and use of authenticity cueswhen deciding
to decline a message.
Finally, themes related to speciﬁc context and routine factors ap-
peared to bemore inﬂuentialwhen choosing to decline genuine author-
ity messages (Context: 11.8%; Routine: 12.9%) compared to mimicked
(Context: 4%; Routine: 8.8%) or low authority messages (Context:
8.5%; Routine: 8.8%). This may be due to genuine messages being de-
clined less as a result of speciﬁc suspicions andmore as a result of exter-
nal factors, such as never accepting updates via pop-up.
5. Conclusions
The current study investigated participant response behaviour to
computer update messages containing varying degrees of fraudulent
cues when they interrupted a demanding serial recall task compared
to when theywere presented in a questionnaire phasewith no compet-
ing demands. By requiring participants to make judgements in two dif-
ferent contexts where heuristic and systematic processing styles were
likely to be differentially invoked, the relationship between message
content, individual differences and processing strategy could be
explored.
5.1. Primary theoretical implications
The ﬁndings of this study provide experimental evidence that sce-
narios likely to evoke heuristic processing (i.e., the serial recall phase
of our experiment) increase susceptibility to fraudulent messages com-
pared to more systematic processing conditions (i.e., the questionnaire
phase), supporting recent models of susceptibility to phishing-based
communications [41,42]. Most importantly, we found a differential im-
pact of these processing conditions on (a) judgements of fraudulent
cues presentwithinmessages and (b) the relationship between individ-
ual differences and response behaviour, providing a basis to extend cur-
rent theoretical approaches to include a wider range of factors, such as
the speciﬁc inﬂuence techniques used and particular individual traits,
that may inﬂuence response behaviour at any given time.
Overall, the processing strategy that is used when an individual re-
sponds to a fraudulent communication appears to be a crucial mecha-
nism in inﬂuencing susceptibility, providing a mediating factor that
links the speciﬁc context that an individual is operating within to their
ultimate response decision. It was hypothesised that the increased cog-
nitive complexity of the serial recall phase would result in the use of
heuristic processing strategies, which in turn would reduce the likeli-
hood of identifying inconsistencieswithinmessages that suggest ames-
sage may not be genuine. In line with this, we identiﬁed that
participants did not differentiate between genuine authority messages
and those that contained errors in authority cues when operating
under cognitive pressure during the serial recall phase. This failure to
identify so-called authenticity ‘trigger’ points within information re-
duced the likelihood that individuals would move from an initial truth
default position to one of suspicion. However, this process wasimproved during the questionnaire phase when participants operated
under conditions more likely to evoke systematic processing strategies
[21,41,42].
It should be noted, however, that mimicked authority messages
were still accepted signiﬁcantly more than messages that did not con-
tain any authority information during the questionnaire phase. This
suggests that the presence of authority information is still able to over-
ride the presence of fraudulent cues, such as spelling errors, even under
optimum processing conditions, whereas a lack of authority informa-
tion was signiﬁcantly less persuasive in such contexts. In this way, fac-
tors within the message content appear to differentially ‘trigger’
suspicion across both heuristic and systematic processing conditions.
As a result, the use of ‘traditional’ cues in determiningmessage legitima-
cy that have been identiﬁed in previous studies, such as poor spelling
and grammar and themessage source [8,17,41], appear to differentially
apply according to both (a) other aspects of the message content (i.e., a
perceived knownmessage source overriding thepresence of spelling er-
rors), and (b) the information processing environment.
Our ﬁnding that a lack of authority information appears to be
weighted more heavily in triggering suspicion than the presence of er-
rors across both experimental phases suggests that authority cues
have an independent persuasive impact. That this difference was
found when all messages equally included urgency and loss inﬂuence
techniques is particularly striking and suggests that the presence of ur-
gency information does not override the absence of authority informa-
tion when individuals make response decisions. As such, the ﬁndings
of Vishwanath et al. [41], whereby the presence of urgency cues
monopolised attentional resources also appears to differentially apply
to other inﬂuence techniques (i.e., authority) and be impacted to a de-
gree, although not entirely, by the availability of cognitive resource. Cur-
rent models of susceptibility to fraudulent communications (e.g., [42])
should therefore consider that (a) the threshold of potential trigger
points is likely to vary according to both the cognitive context of the in-
dividual and the particular inﬂuence techniques used within the mes-
sage, and (b) certain inﬂuence techniques may prove more resistant
than others to systematic processing strategies. Therefore, a consider-
ation of the relative role of message factors should be incorporated
into susceptibility models [41,42].
Finally, therewas tentative support for the hypothesis that individu-
al differences in trust impact on response behaviour [14], but this relat-
ed primarily to scenario-speciﬁc conceptualisations (i.e., trust in
computer communications and trust in the system). However, where
such effects were identiﬁed, these were found to have a differential im-
pact on response behaviour according to the cognitive context experi-
enced. In particular, such individual differences were related to the
likelihood of accepting fraudulent updates primarily when participants
were operating under optimum conditions (i.e., wheremore systematic
processing strategies were likely to be used). This suggests that in sce-
narios with a higher degree of cognitive pressure, individuals are equal-
ly vulnerable to being truth-biased [21], unless fraudulentmessages are
particularly easy to identify, in which case a higher degree of trust may
reduce the likelihood of suspicion being triggered. Although individual
differences in factors such as trust and awareness should therefore be
included in susceptibility models, their relative impact across contexts
and message types requires further investigation in relation to primary
processing mechanisms. It may be that individual differences are to an
extent negated by factors related to the cognitive context and message
content, such that heuristic processing strategies increase trust in all re-
cipients to an equal level, decreasing the ability to notice inconsistencies
to a similar degree as those high in trust may experience when operat-
ing under optimum conditions.
5.2. Practical implications
The current study has identiﬁed that engaging in a cognitively de-
manding task reduces the ability to effectively identify fraudulent
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This leads to a greater trust of fraudulent messages, which combines
with the use of inﬂuence techniques designed to attract attention, to re-
duce the likelihood that inconsistencies or other fraudulent cues within
the message will be noticed and trigger suspicion. These context-in-
duced processing biases appear to override the impact of awareness
and other individual differences to encourage people to ‘accept’. Since
the appearance of any fraudulent computer message is likely to inter-
rupt a current primary task(s), this is likely to further increase pressure
on employees to respond to such notiﬁcations as quickly as possible,
and therefore heuristically, in order to avoid lost productivity [35]. As
systems become increasingly integrated and complex, it is therefore es-
sential that a holistic approach involving supportive software design,
improved digital literacy, and training opportunities within pressured
scenarios, be taken to address these susceptibilities by assisting in the
‘triggering’ of suspicion in the user.
Although awareness of fraud and phishing attacks may beneﬁt indi-
viduals when responding to communications in optimum conditions,
the ﬁndings of the current study suggest that such approaches are not
sufﬁcient to impact on behaviourwhen operating under cognitive pres-
sure. As a result, decision support systems that reduce the impact of
these heuristic processes via user-centred design would beneﬁt from
further development (e.g., [33]). Ideally, such development would be
responsive to the increased cognitive pressure of a user and provide as-
sistance in the direction of attention, the identiﬁcation of inconsis-
tencies and errors within message content, and the provision of in-
the-moment technical knowledge, in order to enhance threat aware-
ness whilst also providing support to address user uncertainty and po-
tential gaps in technical understanding.
5.3. Limitations and future work
The current study represents an important exploration of individual
and message-based factors that inﬂuence people to respond to fraudu-
lent communications across different information processing condi-
tions. Within the serial recall task, only a small number of messages
were used in order to reduce the predictability ofmessage interruptions
whilst keeping the overall serial recall task length manageable for par-
ticipants (e.g., [29]). Future work examining the impact of differing fre-
quencies of messages (i.e., low vs. high rate of interruptions) would be
beneﬁcial in order to explore the potential role of habituation to such
messages on subsequent judgements. Due to the small number of inter-
ruption messages that could be used within the serial recall task, this
study also focused explicitly on only one inﬂuence technique (authority
cues). However, this ‘mimicking’ style is an increasingly common tech-
nique within phishing scenarios and allowed us to explore whether the
inclusion of errors, as commonly found in phishingmessages, impacted
on the persuasiveness of this inﬂuence technique across two processing
scenarios (i.e., whether errors in authority messages were less likely to
be noticed than the absence of authority information). As a result, other
inﬂuence techniques commonly used in fraudulentmessages were kept
constant to ensure that these effects could be reliably examined, thus
limiting the ability to manipulate additional content factors. Further
work is therefore required to examine the relative contribution of
other inﬂuence techniques, such as urgency cues and the use of loss ver-
sus reward-based techniques, by systematically manipulating the pres-
ence of this information in fraudulent messages, both independently
and in combination with other techniques.
When exploring the qualitative themes regardingwhy people chose
to respond to the computer updatemessages, datawas collected during
the questionnaire phase of the study and therefore it should be consid-
ered that the ﬁndings might only be applicable to this context. The po-
tential reasons and themes given may therefore differ if participants
are asked about their decisionmaking duringmore cognitively complex
scenarios when they are likely to be respondingmore heuristically (e.g.,
the serial recall phase), for example, through a lower reference toauthority cues and a higher reference to inﬂuence cues. However, due
to the nature of the serial recall task, this data could not be collected fol-
lowing participant responses to each message type in the serial recall
phase and would also likely impact on participant response choice dur-
ing the questionnaire phase of the study. Furthermore, the question-
naire phase of the study was designed to maximise the likelihood of
systematic processing strategies being used, with the inclusion of ques-
tions related to decision strategies likely to have increased correspond-
ing suspicion and thus the likelihood that authenticity information
would impact on response behaviour. In order to examine potential dif-
ferences in the distribution of themes whilst avoiding creating the
above effect in heuristic processing conditions, future work would
need to use different qualitative data collection mechanisms, such as
think aloud protocols.
Finally, within this study respondents were not using their home
computers and were instead using university PCs under controlled lab-
oratory testing conditions. This may limit the generalisability of the
ﬁndings to home computer users and instead focuses more explicitly
on computer users within organisational settings, such as awork or uni-
versity context. Since the sample of this study was limited to predomi-
nantly female university students, the ﬁndings are particularly
relevant to contextswhere young adults are the predominant computer
users, such as universities, colleges or organisations employing individ-
uals from this group. However, more research is required to determine
the extent that the approach of this group of users (in terms of both age
and gender) may differ from other demographic groups when dealing
with computer security in cognitively complex conditions (e.g., [16]).
Although the design of the genuine updates in this studywere based
on actual updates experienced by computer users (e.g., the authors and
their research team members), it is also acknowledged that they were
still developed by the researchers for the purposes of the experiment.
During the questionnaire phase, participants were asked how they
would ordinarily respond to such messages, which may differ from de-
cisions made during laboratory tasks that are considered to be less per-
sonally relevant, and therefore effortful systematic processing strategies
may not be considered necessary. Further targeted work using a range
of decision scenarios will enable such potential differences to be further
explored and disentangled.Funding
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